- Sezzle Inc. is a Minneapolis-based ‘Buy Now, Pay Later’ (BNPL) company founded in 2016.
- Its stock is up 2,015% in the last year, driven by investor confidence that it is a growing, profitable business that recently reported 71% year-over-year revenue growth.
- Sezzle trades at a premium 5.5x forward sales multiple, representing a 63% premium to peers, based on these lofty expectations.
- But in reality, our findings show Sezzle is borrowing expensive capital to make extremely risky loans through a struggling platform that is rapidly losing customers and merchants. All the while, insiders are selling stock or cashing out through a massive margin loan.
- Sezzle’s Chairman and CEO has pledged $542 million in shares as collateral for a margin loan, representing ~30% of the company’s total shares, as disclosed in an obscure footnote on page 42 of a September 2024 proxy statement.
- Insiders have sold ~$71 million in stock this year, including a key pre-IPO investor who has reduced their stake by 87%.
- In 2019, Sezzle listed in Australia, where it faced accusations of being highly promotional, withholding negative information from shareholders and engaging in high-risk lending. The stock later collapsed following reports of significant bad debts and speculation of bankruptcy.
- Despite its collapse in Australia, as it prepared for its move to Nasdaq, Sezzle was able to report profitability in February 2023, partly by recording significantly lower provisions for bad loans.
- However, filings show Sezzle borrows at a 12.65% interest rate to lend to extremely high-risk consumers whose credit is so bad that they are unable to access traditional credit cards or loans and use BNPL options for otherwise everyday purchases.
- Sezzle’s earnings growth in 2024 appears significantly driven by rapidly issuing lower-quality loans, despite U.S. consumers already being stretched thin with rising credit card delinquency rates. While Sezzle’s loan book grew by just 6% year over year, its provisions for credit losses grew by 130%.
- Sezzle’s COO and “Head of Risk” has no apparent prior corporate experience, per his SEC biography, and was previously a teaching specialist at the University of Minnesota.
- Merchants are abandoning Sezzle’s platform, with the company reporting only 23,000 active merchants, down 51% since 2021, per its own disclosures. Even these numbers may be exaggerated— we found only 6,776 merchants on its website.
- Despite loud announcements at signing, key merchant partnerships such as Target, Lamps Plus, Bellacor, and Ministry of Supply seem to have quietly failed.
- For example, in October 2021, Target announced partnerships with Sezzle and Affirm where it would directly integrate Sezzle into its checkout. As of December 2024, PayPal and Affirm are the only BNPL options on Target’s checkout.
- Beyond losing merchants, Sezzle has also seen its active customer count decline by 20% since 2021, all while key competitors grow rapidly. Oddly, despite this, the company has reported 2.5x growth in its subscription products, which represented 33% of last quarter’s revenue.
- Sezzle seems to be boosting its near-term subscription numbers with sketchy enrollment practices. The company has faced numerous customer complaints for enrolling users into recurring monthly subscriptions without their awareness, according to user complaints and the company’s own FAQ.
- Consumer complaints about Sezzle are spiking, with the company receiving a 1.1-star average rating and 986 complaints over the last three years on the Better Business Bureau (BBB) database.
- Overall, we think Sezzle has already been left in the dust by peers like Affirm, Klarna and Afterpay. The company has reported rosy numbers using short-term tricks, giving insiders an opportunity to exit. We do not see Sezzle surviving in the long-term.
Initial Disclosure: After extensive research, we have taken a short position in shares of Sezzle Inc. (Nasdaq:SEZL). This report represents our opinion, and we encourage every reader to do their own due diligence. Please see our full disclaimer at the bottom of the report.
Background: $1.8 Billion U.S. Focused Buy Now, Pay Later Business
Sezzle Inc. is a Minneapolis-based Buy Now, Pay Later (“BNPL”) company that was started in 2016. Its BNPL offering is available via an app or virtual card that can be used to pay for purchases.
In Q3 2024, the company reported it had 2.7 million active consumers using its application and 23,000 active merchants on its platform.
Approximately 52% of Sezzle’s Q3 2024 revenue was derived from “transaction income,” which includes merchant processing fees, consumer fees, interchange fees, and promotional incentives with third parties.
In the same period, almost 33% of revenue was derived from Sezzle’s two “subscription” offerings, “Sezzle Premium” and “Sezzle Anywhere,” which offer benefits in exchange for a recurring fee.
The company offers these products mainly to consumers whose credit is so bad they are unable to get credit cards or traditional loans. Or, as Sezzle puts it, its goal is to increase “financial inclusion by providing credit to those who often face challenges in accessing traditional credit options”. [Pg. 14]
Sezzle Premium allows consumers to use the Sezzle app at select “premium” merchants for a monthly fee of $12.99. Sezzle Anywhere creates a virtual Visa card that can be used anywhere that regular Visa cards are accepted for a $17.99 monthly fee. Sezzle On-Demand, launched in Q3 2024, creates a one-time use Visa card for a service fee of up to $5.99.
Bull Case: Profitable U.S. BNPL Business Reporting Incredible 71% YoY Revenue Growth
Sezzle’s Stock Is Up 2,015% In The Past Year
Since listing on NASDAQ in August 2023, Sezzle has benefited from the “nascent and growing” BNPL market in the U.S., per its November 2024 investor presentation. [Slide 10]
Sezzle’s total revenue for Q3 2024 rose by 71.3% year-over-year, reaching $70 million. [Slide 33] Underlying merchant sales grew by 40.6% year-over-year, and net income spiked 1,093% year-over-year to $15.4 million, giving investors hope that the company is on a rapid, sustainable growth trajectory.
Valuation: Sezzle Trades At A Premium 5.5x Forward Sales Multiple, A 63% Premium to Peers
Over 200 providers compete in the BNPL space, per FIS’ 2023 Global Payments Report, including specialized and well-established fintech companies like Affirm, Klarna, and Afterpay, as well as traditional banks and software providers.
Sezzle’s valuation has catapulted the company to a 5.5x forward sales multiple, far higher than most publicly comparable peers such as Zip, Dave, and Moneylion.[1]
Only Affirm has a richer premium at 6.1x forward sales. Unlike Sezzle, Affirm has meaningful relationships with large merchants like Amazon, a larger ecosystem of 19.5 million users and over 320,000 merchants.
The company funds much of its lending with a line of credit from non-traditional lender Bastion Management. As of last quarter, Sezzle had $95 million outstanding on its line of credit, which carried an effective interest rate of 12.65%. [Pgs. 4, 17]
In other words, Sezzle trades at a premium valuation despite relying on high-interest capital to fund high-risk loans to subprime borrowers unable to get credit cards or access to other normal forms of financing.
Key Red Flag: Sezzle’s CEO and Chairman Has Pledged $542 Million In Shares For A Margin Loan, Representing 30% Of The Company’s Total Shares, Per A Footnote Buried On Page 42 Of A September 2024 Proxy Statement
In September 2024, buried in a footnote in one of Sezzle’s proxy statements, we found a disclosure showing that the company’s Chairman & CEO Charlie Youakim pledged 1.72 million shares, representing 70% of his total holdings, as collateral to secure margin loans.
The pledge was again disclosed in a footnote in Sezzle’s October 2024 proxy statement and represents 30% of the total shares outstanding for the entire company.
Margin loans enable shareholders to extract cash from their shares without selling and without the need to file Form 4s. They are a risky form of debt because if the collateral (shares) drops in value, it could trigger a margin call from creditors and the risk of a forced share sale, which in turn could lead to lower collateral (share) prices.
Typically, it bodes poorly for investors when key insiders quietly take advantage of a way to cash out using a huge portion of the entire company.
Red Flag: Insiders Have Sold ~$71 Million In Stock This Year Including A Key Pre-IPO Investor That Has Cut Its Stake By 87%
Despite Sezzle’s rapid year-over year-growth, insiders have also sold stock outright, cashing out ~$71 million in 2024 alone.
These sales have been led by led by private equity firm Continental Investment Partners. In 2019, Continental served as a key pre-IPO investor ahead of Sezzle’s Australia listing (more on this shortly).
Continental’s partner and co-founder Paul Purcell resigned from the Sezzle board on June 6, 2024. Since then, he has filed 62 Form 4s detailing continued share sales totaling $55.7 million, representing ~87.50% of their total holdings, per FactSet.
Additionally, Sezzle Co-Founder Paul Paradis has reduced his holdings by 43% overall, per FactSet, including open market sales and a gift to a private trust.
Background: In 2019, Sezzle Listed In Australia, Where It Was Accused Of Being Highly Promotional, Enriching Insiders While Hiding Negative Information From Shareholders, And Engaging In High-Risk Lending
The Stock Collapsed After Reporting Significant Bad Debts, With Speculation That It Was Nearing Bankruptcy
Before listing on NASDAQ, Sezzle listed in Australia in July 2019, raising $30 million USD. Sezzle’s listing was initially met with excitement as enthusiasm swept up stocks in the BNPL space, with its shares reaching a peak of AUD $11.60 in February 2021.
Two years after the Australian IPO, in June 2021, a local fund manager, East 72 Holdings, detailed in a lengthy letter how Sezzle was a highly promotional company that (i) hid negative information (ii) underperformed peers (iii) engaged in lending to high-risk customers, and (iv) faced tightening credit on its own balance sheet.
By February 2022, the stock had fallen by over 80%, from AUD $11.60 to AUD $2.00 per share. That same month, Sezzle announced a lifeline for investors—a definitive agreement to merge with larger competitor Zip, another BNPL company based in Australia, in an all-stock transaction valuing Sezzle at AUD $491 million.
In July 2022, the merger was called off as “bad debts have continued to spiral at both companies”, per Australian Financial news outlet AFR:
“The merger termination leaves a cloud over claims that buy now, pay later algorithms would learn faster, leading to better credit decision-making, as their volumes grow. In February, Zip and Sezzle said they would achieve cash savings of $130 million through the tie-up, but bad debts have continued to spiral at both companies.”
After the announcement, Sezzle shares traded to lows of AUD $0.26, with speculation that it would need to file for bankruptcy.
Part 1: From Australia To Nasdaq—The U.S. Reincarnation Of Sezzle Looks No Different
Despite Its Collapse In Australia, In February 2023, Sezzle Reported It Had Miraculously Achieved Profitability, Partly By Reporting Vastly Lower Provisions For Bad Loans
Despite Sezzle’s early struggles in Australia, from Q4 2021 to Q4 2022, Sezzle was able to convert a $25.9 million quarterly loss to a $600,000 net profit. [Pgs. 8, 14]
Around 40% of the change in net income was driven by the company rapidly recording lower provisions for uncollectible accounts, from 3.5% of underlying merchant sales in Q4 2021 down to 1.2% in Q4 2022, which it attributed to better collection and implementation of “Prophet”, its proprietary consumer credit scoring system. [Pgs. 8, 14]
With these fresh numbers in hand, on March 13, 2023 Sezzle announced its intention to move its share listing to NASDAQ. Given that the stock price was still languishing, the company enacted a 38:1 reverse stock split in May, 2023 in order to meet the Nasdaq $4 per share price requirement. Sezzle listed on NASDAQ in August 2023.
Subsequent Earnings Growth In 2024 Appears To Have Been Driven In Part By Rapidly Issuing Lower-Quality Loans
U.S. Consumers Are Already Stretched Thin With Credit Card Delinquency Rates On The Rise
Sezzle’s business model involves borrowing money, then lending consumers that money to purchase goods, generating transaction fees as well as justifying a use case for its consumer subscription services.
To do this, Sezzle holds a BNPL loan portfolio of $151 million in gross loans on its balance sheet, with current allowances for loan losses of 12%. As noted earlier, the loan portfolio is financed by a line of credit with $95 million outstanding, bearing an interest rate of 12.65% as of last quarter. For 2023, Sezzle’s average interest rate on its line of credit was a nosebleed 16.78%. [Pg. 80]
In its most recent earnings call, Sezzle stated its provisions for uncollectable accounts would trend higher in the second half of the year due to seasonality and its decision “to open the funnel to more consumers given the confidence we have in our underwriting models.”
“Open the funnel” seems to equate to simply taking on far more risk.
As of last quarter, Sezzle’s provision for credit losses grew by 130% year-over-year while its loan book increased by only 6% in the same period. [Pg. 5]
Sezzle also reported last quarter that it was increasingly dipping into riskier credit customers.
The company has shirked the precision of traditional FICO credit-scoring models and uses its own proprietary “Prophet” score with only three possible ratings, A, B, or C, with “C” being the worst. The company does not make clear a comparable FICO score range for these buckets.
C-Rated loans, the worst quality, were up 22% year to date, now representing 29% of the portfolio. [Pg. 14]
In tandem with worsening underwriting, notes past due from 1-90 days have spiked by 90% since the end of 2023, now sitting at $25 million.
As Sezzle’s credit metrics show rapidly increasing distress, the U.S. consumer appears to be equally as stretched, with credit card delinquencies increasing steeply.
Given that Sezzle loans to consumers who are often unable to access traditional credit cards due to bad credit, this trend bodes poorly for Sezzle’s $151 million BNPL loan book. [Pg. 4]
Red Flag: Sezzle’s COO And “Head Of Risk” Has No Apparent Prior Corporate Experience Per His SEC Biography, And Was A Teaching Specialist At The University Of Minnesota Before Joining Sezzle
Given that Sezzle’s core business involves managing its credit risk, one might assume the company’s “Head of Risk” is one of its most crucial C-Suite roles, working closely with the CEO and CFO.
One might have also expected the company to hire an individual for this role with significant corporate lending and credit risk experience.
Amin Sabzivand joined Sezzle in 2018. Prior to that, he received Masters degrees in engineering and financial math and was a teaching specialist at his alma mater, the University of Minnesota. His official SEC biography does not report any prior corporate experience.
Since 2023, Sabzivand has served as head of “Risk, Data, Engineering and Product departments at Sezzle.”
Part 2: Merchants Are Fleeing Sezzle’s Platform In Droves, With Key Partnerships Seemingly Abandoned
Since 2021, Sezzle Has Lost At Least 51% Of Its Merchants, Per The Company’s Own Disclosures
Traditionally, merchant fees have been a major source of revenue for Sezzle, which is why Sezzle and other BNPL companies like Affirm have focused on growing merchant partnerships to fuel growth.
Affirm saw a 21% increase in active merchants YoY in Q3 2024. [Pg. 6] In contrast, Sezzle has lost more than 51% of its active merchants since 2021, per its own filings and press releases:
YE 2021: 47,000 Active Merchants
YE 2022: 42,000 Active Merchants
YE 2023: 28,000 Active Merchants
Q3 2024: 23,000 Active Merchants
As evidenced by the downward trend, Sezzle is rapidly losing market share, while peers have vastly more robust offerings:
| Company | Active Merchant Accounts |
| Sezzle | 23,000 |
| Affirm | 320,000 |
| AfterPay | 348,000 |
| Klarna | 600,000 |
| Paypal | 1,000,000+ |
Beyond Sezzle’s dwindling industry presence compared to peers, even Sezzle’s claims of 23,000 active merchants seem questionable, based on the company’s own website. The website shows just 6,776 active merchants as of our testing this week:
Further, even though large merchants like Amazon, Target and Nike are listed on Sezzle’s merchants page, these merchants don’t fully integrate Sezzle into their respective platforms—they seem to merely let Sezzle customers buy their products from within Sezzle’s app.[2] (In other words, you cannot select Sezzle as a default payment option at checkout when you shop at Amazon, Target or Nike.)
The problem with this arrangement for consumers is that they are required to pay fees when using Sezzle to make purchases from these “non-integrated premium merchants”.[3]
Many Of Sezzle’s Key Merchant Partnerships Appear To Have Failed, Including Target, Lamps Plus, Bellacor, And Ministry Of Supply
Since 2021, Sezzle has touted an array of new and critical merchant relationships that later seem to have quietly fizzled.
In October 2021, Target Announced It Would Work With BNPL Providers Sezzle And Affirm, A Major Partnership Integrated Into Target’s Customer Experience
As Of December 2024, PayPal and Affirm Are The Only BNPL Options On Target’s Web Checkout
In October 2021, Target announced a partnership with 2 BNPL operators, Sezzle and Affirm, in a major win for both payment providers. Per the press release, the offerings would be integrated within Target’s shopping experience. Sezzle press released the deal as well.
At some point, Sezzle appears to have been integrated into Target’s website directly, per a blog post dated May 24, 2022, showing this screenshot:
But 3 years after the initial deal, when we checked Target’s online payment options in December 2024, Affirm and PayPal were the only BNPL options available at checkout.
Sezzle’s current relationship with Target seems to be one where Sezzle offers Target payment through its own app, where users can buy Target goods with a Sezzle card, but not simply select Sezzle through Target’s checkout experience as before.
In May 2021, Sezzle Announced A Relationship With Lamps Plus, With Its Products Integrated Into The Lamps Plus Shopping Experience
As Of December 2024, Sezzle No Longer Appears As A Payment Option, With PayPal Listed As The Only BNPL Option At Checkout
In May 2021, Sezzle announced a relationship with Lamps Plus, recognized as “a top 10 housewares/home furnishings retailer”, per its press release. An October 2021 Sezzle press release indicated that the relationship was going well, with Lamps Plus President Clark Linstone saying:
“Sezzle has proven to be a valuable flexible payment option for Lamps Plus because some customers prefer to make four equal payments over time instead of paying the full amount at the time of their purchase”.
Lamps Plus still integrated Sezzle in its shopping experience as of January 31, 2023, along with PayPal, per a Lamps Plus FAQ:
However, as of our checks in December 2024, Paypal, not Sezzle, was the only BNPL option on Lamps Plus’s website at checkout:
We called Lamps Plus in October 2024 and confirmed that PayPal is the only BNPL service currently offered directly to customers.
Sezzle’s Relationships With Multiple Other Featured Merchants Also Appear To Have Fizzled, Including Bellacor And Ministry of Supply
Merchant Partner Growth Has Been A Key Driver Of BNPL Adoption Across The Entire Space For A Reason – It Results In Merchants Paying Fees Not Consumers And Merchants Bringing New Consumers To BNPL
In October 2021, Sezzle announced a merchant partnership with Bellacor, a lighting and home décor company.[4] Once again, we checked its website this month and found Sezzle was not offered as a BNPL option. Instead, it offered Affirm, PayPal and Amazon Pay.
Clothing company Ministry of Supply is currently featured as a case study on Sezzle’s “Merchants” page of its website.
We called Ministry of Supply and checked its website: Sezzle is not a checkout option there either. On a December 2024 call with Ministry of Supply, we were told that PayPal and Shop Pay from Affirm were the only available installment payment options from checkout.
Sezzle has been reliant on merchants paying fees and driving a diverse consumer base to its BNPL offering, which in turn allowed it to gain competitive share.
As merchants drop off the platform, the process is reversing. Furthermore, the value proposition for consumers to pay a premium subscription fee for an inferior and shrinking offering threatens to choke out its other revenue sources.
Finally, this dynamic results in Sezzle being left with higher-risk consumers and loans. Historically, consumers willing to shop through Sezzle’s platform have represented a higher credit risk, per the company’s disclosures. [Pg. 53] This is likely because consumers would have otherwise purchased directly from the merchant, but may have had such bad credit that they were unable to.
Part 4: Losing Customers And Sketchy Tactics
Sezzle Has Seen Its Active Customer Count Decline By 20% Since 2021
Sezzle’s consumer experience is paramount to the company’s success, with 33% of Q3 2024 revenue being generated from Sezzle’s consumer facing subscription services.
As merchants decline, so too have users. Sezzle’s Active Customer count has declined from 3.4 million in 2021 to 2.7 million as of last quarter, a decline of 20%. [Pg. 6, Pg. 21]
Sezzle’s Subscription Growth Seems To Have Been Driven By Sketchily Signing Up Customers For Recurring Monthly Subscriptions Without Them Even Realizing It, Per User Complaints And The Company’s Own FAQ
One question that came up in our research is how Sezzle has managed to report explosive growth in paid subscriptions. Sezzle’s reported financials show strong active subscriber growth, up 2.5x year-over-year.
This growth comes despite competitors offering free options and despite Sezzle’s merchant and user counts declining.
Sezzle’s subscription revenue (including Sezzle Anywhere and Sezzle Premium) have been key drivers of total sales growth for Sezzle, which has seen this category grow revenue by 167% year over year, representing almost 33% of total revenue as of last quarter. [Pg. 27]
For a casual observer, it might look like these subscription products are seeing soaring organic growth, representing a key source of future high-margin growth. However, consumer complaints show that much of this seems to be driven by either deceptive or unwitting sign-ups.
For several examples, complaints on TrustPilot regularly describe how users are signed up for Sezzle’s subscription services without their knowledge:
Users on Reddit also flagged the “sneaky” Sezzle subscription:
The issue appears to be so widespread that Sezzle even addresses it on its own website in a FAQ page titled, “I don’t remember signing up for Sezzle premium or Anywhere”. The post acknowledges that users are signing up for the subscription services unwittingly at checkout.
When a revenue source soars in significant part due to users accidentally signing up for a service (or being tricked into it), rather than because they actually wanted the service, it usually bodes poorly in the long term.
Complaints About Sezzle Have Been Soaring On Consumer Complaint Databases
Given the rapid growth, one would expect to see a sea of positive reviews for Sezzle. Yet at the Better Business Bureau (“BBB”), Sezzle has an average rating of 1.1 stars with 986 complaints over the last 3 years. Many of the negative BBB complaints were focused on excessive or unannounced fees.
In May 2022, Sezzle was accused of hiding the risk of bank overdrafts to users in a class action complaint.
A search of CFPB’s consumer complaint database for the key word “Sezzle” also revealed a rapid rise in complaints from July to October 2024 related to credit reporting, debt collection and other consumer complaints.[5]
Conclusion: Borrowing Expensive Capital To Make Risky Loans Through A Failing Platform With Dissatisfied Customers, All While Insiders Sell Or Cash Out Via A Massive Margin Loan—What Could Possibly Go Wrong?
Every couple of years, a slew of firms go public claiming to have found the holy grail of high-risk lending.
These days, many attribute their success to “AI”, “machine learning”, “algorithms” or having some type of “new model”, claiming they can track everything from the customer’s hair color to what angle their laptop monitor is tilted at when they make a purchase. With endless data and analytics in hand, these companies tell the market they have found new and innovative ways to lend to people with no money and/or terrible credit.
As it turns out, handing money out is always the easy part – but having it paid back with interest is much harder. Eventually, in every instance, investors learn there is no new magical lending model.
As merchants and consumers gravitate toward platforms with stability, scale, larger user ecosystems and fewer consumer facing fees, we expect Sezzle’s business will continue to fade away. As Sezzle’s risky loans age, we expect credit losses will swallow the business.
While the company can attempt to hastily issue riskier credit to create the appearance of near-term growth, its model is simply not sustainable – and we think insiders rapidly exiting their stakes is an indication that they already know this.
Disclosure: We are short shares of Sezzle Inc. (Nasdaq:SEZL)
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[1] Note that Klarna is private and Afterpay is owned by the larger, more diversified Block, Inc.
[2] Sezzle refers to these as “non-integrated” merchants.
[3] Access to non-integrated merchants requires either a $12.99 “Premium” subscription, a $17.99 monthly “Anywhere” subscription, or “On-Demand” which carries a convenience fee up to $5.99 per use.
[4] Bellacor was acquired in 2024.
[5] To replicate this search, navigate to CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database and enter “Sezzle Inc.” under company name.